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PHILOSOPHY OF SCIENCE 
ON THE MORAL NEUTRALITY OF SCIENTIFIC ACCEPTANCE 
Robert Audi 
Department of Philosophy 
University of Nebraska-Lincoln 
Lincoln, Nebraska 68588 
This paper explores the question of whether scientific acceptance 
of hypotheses requires making moral or other non-epistemic judgments. 
Much of the paper discusses the controversy surrounding an influential 
argument proposed by Richard Rudner to show that scientists qua 
scientists must make value judgments. Isaac Levi's well-known critique 
of Rudner's argument is examined, and the argument is assessed both in 
the light of Levi's distinction between accepting a hypothesis and acting 
on it, and in terms of a partial analysis of what constitutes scientific 
acceptance. On the basis of this analysis, the question whether scientists 
may properly accept hypotheses, rather than simply assess their degree 
of confirmation, is also briefly explored. The paper concludes that none 
of the arguments considered shows either that scientists should never 
accept hypotheses or that, when they do, moral considerations must 
form part of the basis of their decision. 
t t t 
Scientific method is widely regarded as a way of ap-
proaching important questions without prejudice. It is com-
monly believed that since its proper use is neutral with respect 
to moral issues it constitutes a court of appeal where people 
with opposing moral views can settle certain of their differ-
ences. If, for instance, competing theories of social justice are 
supported by conflicting factual claims about the effects of 
certain methods of distribUting benefits and burdens, these 
claims might be assessed by scientific procedures that do not 
favor any moral position. The results of scientific inquiry, 
then, could provide an objective basis for deciding fairly be-
tween the two moral positions. To be sure, it is generally ad-
mitted that in the choice of research problems or even in the 
formation of hypotheses scientists may be influenced by their 
moral views. But this may be plausibly said to affect only the 
context of discovery, not that of validation: moral commit-
ments may affect-quite properly-what is selected for scien-
tific study, and they may sometimes (and here improperly) 
affect what hypotheses are created; but when it comes to what 
hypotheses are SCientifically accepted there are rigorous, non-
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moral standards of validation which protect us from subjectiv-
ity or prejudice. 
This conception of the moral neutrality of scientific ac-
ceptance has been challenged even by those who accept, as 
most philosophers of science do, a far-reaching distinction 
between the context of validation and that of discovery. The 
issue is of major importance for understanding science and, 
less obviously, of almost equal significance for understanding 
ethics. For even those who recognize important similarities 
between ethics and science as disciplines which develop 
theories to explain data have tended to take scientific method 
-as applied to validation-to be morally neutral; and cer-
tainly the contrast between normative questions, such as 
what sorts of actions are right, and factual questions, has 
usually assumed that scientific hypotheses are paradigms of 
factual propositions assessible without using any moral notions 
or presupposing answers to any moral questions. If this 
assumption is mistaken, then ethics as a normative discipline 
cannot be understood in contrast to science, if indeed the 
normative-factual distinction can still be plausibly main-
tained. Moreover, if, even in the context of validation, scien-
tists must make moral judgments or use moral concepts, the 
standard view that scientific method provides an objective 
way to study nature is weakened. For while there may well be 
an objective method for assessing moral judgments, this is 
highly controversial. If the proper use of scientific method 
requires making moral judgments, the case for the objectivity 
of the method must be recast, and clearly appeals to the 
method as a neutral way of adjudicating between certain 
competing moral views will be undermined. 
The case against the moral neutrality of scientific ac-
ceptance will be explored in Section I. What constitutes 
acceptance, whether it is essential to scientific inquiry, and 
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how non-epistemic factors may affect it will be considered. 
The point of departure is the widely known exchange between 
Rudner and Levi, to which we now turn. 
I 
Rudner (1953) provided what is to date perhaps the 
most plausible case for the view that the scientist qua scientist 
makes value judgments. The force of "qua" is largely to imply 
that moral or other non-epistemic normative judgments are 
characteristically required for the scientific acceptance of hy-
potheses. His central argument runs as follows: 
1. The scientist qua scientist accepts or rejects hy-
potheses. 
2. This requires deciding whether the evidence is suffi-
ciently strong to warrant accepting the hypothesis. 
3. The scientist's decision whether the evidence is strong 
enough to warrant accepting the hypothesis is "a 
function of the importance, in the typically ethical 
sense, of making a mistake in accepting or rejecting 
the hypothesis." Hence, 
4. The scientist qua scientist makes value judgments. 
Rudner illustrated with reference to the hypothesis that a 
toxic ingredient in a drug is not present in lethal quantity: 
"we would require a relatively high degree of confirmation or 
confidence before accepting the hypothesis-for the conse-
quences of making a mistake here are exceedingly grave by our 
moral standards," and "how sure we need to be before we ac-
cept [such} a hypothesis will depend on how serious a mistake 
would be." Rudner (1953) was quite aware of the objection 
that a scientist's business is only to determine the degree of 
confirmation of a hypothesis. His reply was that this only 
moves his point to different territory. "For the determination 
that the degree of confirmation is, say, p ... is clearly nothing 
more than the acceptance by the scientist of the hypothesis 
that the degree of confidence is p. " 
These arguments have been widely discussed and often 
criticized. Levi (1960) evaluated them in detail and has dis-
cussed the central issues in a number of other places. It will be 
useful to begin by considering his initial response to Rudner. 
He first attacked Premise 3. His central criticism was that 
choosing to accept a hypothesis does not entail choosing 
to act on it in relation to any specific objective. For "a person 
can meaningfully and consistently be said to accept a hy-
pothesis without having a practical objective." Thus, one can 
accept a hypothesis in an open-ended situation and hence need 
not thereby choose to act on it relative to any particular 
objective. 
Levi (1960) also considered another line of reply to 
Rudner, which, at the time, he drew from Carnap (1950), 
Hempel (1949), and Jeffrey (1956). On this view, accep-
tance of hypotheses is not required of scientists; rather, 
they should be content to assign degrees of confirmation 
to hypotheses relative to the available evidence, and "anyone 
who is confronted with a practical decision problem can 
go to the scientist to ascertain the degrees of confirmation 
of the relevant hypotheses" (Levi, 1960). Levi rejected this 
as "like crashing into Scylla to avoid Charybdis," and he 
attempted to reconcile his view that scientists do accept 
and reject hypotheses, with the value-neutrality of science. 
He based his reconciliation on two contentions. The first 
was that: 
The necessity of assigning minimum probabilities for 
accepting or rejecting hypotheses does not imply 
that the values, preferences, temperament, etc. of the 
investigator, or of the group whose interests he serves, 
determine the assignment of these minima (Levi, 
1960). 
Second, the value neutrality thesis does not preclude the 
scientist qua scientist's making any value judgments. What it 
requires is that "given his commitment to the canons of in-
ference he need make no further value judgments." 
Regarding this last point, Levi did not commit him-
self on the crucial question "whether the canons of scien-
tific inference dictate assignments of minimum probabilities 
in such a way as to permit no differences in the assignments 
made by different investigators to the same set of alterna-
tive hypotheses." He has treated this and similar questions at 
length in more recent writings (e.g., Levi, 1967). A detailed 
discussion of his views on the issue will not be necessary 
since our concerns are essentially neutral with respect to 
specific criteria of confirmation or acceptance and should 
apply to any plausible set of such criteria. For our purposes, 
criteria of confirmation and acceptance need to be considered 
only in relation to the question whether, in evaluating scien-
tific hypotheses, scientists as such must make moral or other 
non-epistemic normative judgments, where epistemic judg-
ments are, paradigmatically, judgments of the degree of 
warrant of a statement relative to a particular body of evi-
dence for it. In discussing this, two distinct though related 
issues will be considered: whether moral or other non-epistemic 
normative judgments must be made in the scientific accep-
tance of a hypothesis, and whether they must be made in 
the scientific assessment of the degree of confirmation of a 
hypothesis. Before proceeding, however, we need to consider 
what constitutes acceptance. As often as this notion has been 
used in recent literature, it remains very much in need of 
further clarification (see, e.g., Burks, 1977; Kaplan, 1981; 
Swinburne, 1980; and Teller, 1980). 
11 
At times "acceptance" is so used that it might be sup-
posed that accepting a proposition is equivalent to believing 
it. But as the term figures in discussions of accepting and 
rejecting hypotheses, belief is surely only a necessary condi-
tion for acceptance. Consider cases in which a scientist decides 
whether a hypothesis is acceptable and as a result of his reflec-
tions accepts it. Here acceptance is surely an event (though not 
necessarily an action). Accepting in this sense entails assenting 
to, or in some sense adopting, the proposition, forming the 
belief that it is true, and, for a time, at least, believing it. There 
is also a dispositional use of "accept," on which to say that 
one accepts a hypothesis is, roughly, to say that one believes it 
and to suggest that one accepts it in the above sense. This is 
the use in which we speak of the body of hypotheses a scien-
tist accepts at a given time. It might be argued that there is a 
quite different, dispositional use; that, e.g., a person who walks 
into an ordinary, well-lighted lecture room accepts the prop-
osition that there are seats in it, even though he has not 
assented to this but has merely seen that it is so. This seems, 
at best, loose parlance, in which accepting is assimilated to 
believing. Perhaps what gives this conception of accepting 
plausibility is the correct point that if the person did for 
some reason entertain the proposition he would accept it. 
These considerations suggest that a person is properly 
said to accept a hypothesis, h, only if its credibility has been 
considered, however unselfconsciously. Perhaps this does not 
hold in general, but it certainly seems to hold for scientific 
acceptance. Indeed, it seems typical of the scientific accep-
tance of a hypothesis that the person not only considers the 
credibility of it, but forms a belief about its credibility -e.g., 
that h is highly confirmed by the evidence-and comes to be-
lieve it in part on the basis of that further belief about its 
credibility. (This further belief may well not express a numer-
ical degree of confirmation, for most scientists do not suppose 
degree of confirmation is in general accurately measurable 
by current procedures, and hence do not in general attribute a 
specific numerical degree of confirmation to their hypotheses.) 
Often, moreover, scientific acceptance of h will involve not 
only a belief of h and a further one regarding its credibility, 
but a second-order belief about the warrant (evidence, con-
ftrmation, grounds) one has for belief that h. 
If scientific acceptance does have this twofold character 
and thus involves, typically, both the belief that h and at least 
one other belief, usually one about the credibility of h or one 
about the warrant for believing h, then care must be taken 
to avoid ambiguity. If we talk, e.g., of the strength of accep-
tance, a distinction between the strength of the belief that h 
and the strength of the quite different belief that h is con-
firmed by the evidence must be made. Still another thing is the 
degree to which the scientist believes h is conftrmed by the 
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evidence. Even when he takes it to be high, say, 0.85, he may 
suspend judgment on h. If it is not believed in such a case, 
there may be a second-order belief that belief of h is barely 
warranted. Such second-order beliefs may also differ both in 
strength and in degree of subjective probability. 
Evaluation can of course occur in arriving at any of the 
beliefs just specified, and it may be different in each case. For 
instance, in arriving at the belief that h is well confirmed by 
the data, the scientist may simply judge intuitively, or may 
explicitly use certain principles of confirmation. Doing the 
latter may, depending on the case, be rather straightforward. 
In arriving at the belief that h, however, there may be reliance 
on special epistemic principles, e.g. "Do not accept a hypothe-
sis with a probability on the evidence less than 0.99." A non-
scientist or a scientist employing extra-scientific criteria of 
acceptance might instead (or in addition) use an ethical prin-
ciple of acceptance, drawn from, say, an "ethics of belief." 
Such a principle might prohibit belief in a hypothesis whose 
probability on the evidence is less than 0.99; it might prohibit 
this only where the matter in question is in some specified 
way important; or it might require a minimum difference in 
probability between an acceptable hypothesis and any com-
peting one. 
It is important that so far scientific acceptance has been 
taken to imply belief. This reflects how acceptance is normally 
construed. But it may be construed differently, in terms of 
what, at the time in question, the scientist would defend if 
the aim were to defend the truth. This is the conception pro-
posed by Kaplan (1981). He offered it, in part, to dissociate 
acceptance from subjective probability. One reason for this is 
that a probabilistic rule of acceptance leads, given plausible 
assumptions, to the Lottery Paradox. Suppose, e.g., the rule 
is that a hypothesis should be accepted when its probability 
on the evidence is at least 0.999. Confronted by a fair lottery 
with 1,000 tickets, one would then believe, of each ticket, 
that it will lose, while believing that (since the lottery is 
fair) one of these very tickets will win! Probabilistic rules of 
acceptance of the kind illustrated must be rejected. But ac-
ceptance does not require the belief of an accepted hypothesis 
to represent it as having a specific probability, so there is little 
temptation to impose a probabilistic rule of acceptance. Kap-
lan (l981) has also eliminated subjective probabilities as neces-
sary components of acceptance, but at the cost of separating 
it, in some cases, from belief -since there are various propo-
sitions, e.g. obvious logical consequences of some beliefs, 
which one does not believe but would defend if their truth 
were questioned. Kaplan's notion of acceptance, then, will 
not be adopted; but such a minimal notion is available and the 
use of it provides another way to approach the question 
whether scientific acceptance is morally neutral. Indeed, 
Kaplan's approach to the logic of acceptance supports the 
view of scientific acceptance defended here. 
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Given these distinctions between kinds of acceptance, we 
are in a good position to evaluate Rudner's argument. Con-
sider his crucial Premise 3: The scientist's decision whether the 
evidence is strong enough to warrant accepting the hypothesis 
(h) is a function of the importance, in the typically ethical 
sense, of making a mistake in accepting or rejecting it. This 
wording-particularly the phrase "decision whether the evi-
dence is strong enough to warrant accepting the hypothesis" -
runs together two questions we have been distinguishing. 
(1) What is the degree of confirmation of h on the evidence? 
(2) Is h acceptable? (Clearly this may be simply a matter of 
having a certain minimum level, usually but not necessarily 
expressed numerically, of confirmation on the evidence.) 
Granted, adopting an epistemic standard for answering ques-
tions of the second kind involves evaluation. But Rudner did 
nothing to show that it need be moral evaluation, or even need 
be done with possible application to morally significant cases 
in mind. He talked, however, as if a separate evaluative ques-
tion - "is this evidence strong enough to warrant accepting this 
hypothesis?" -must come up in typical cases of acceptance, 
as if for each case there are special considerations, such as the 
practical implications of acceptance, which must be weighed. 
Certainly such questions might come up and might lead to 
reassessment of the relevant epistemic standard; but that need 
not happen. Moreover, either of the questions-(l) and (2)-
that does come up in deciding the scientific acceptability of h 
could lead to such reassessment. But answering them does not 
require it, and Rudner did not show that scientific acceptance 
entails the application of standards beyond those a scientist 
has already adopted beforehand, quite possibly on purely 
epistemic grounds. 
This assessment of Rudner's crucial premise is a good 
background for evaluating some key elements in Levi's reply, 
outlined earlier. Surely, as Levi and others have maintained, 
a hypothesis can be accepted without having in mind any 
specific practical objective. This point may be sufficient to 
block Rudner's argument. The general issue might be assessed 
further, however. Suppose that a scientist does accept a hy-
pothesis with the idea of using it to solve practical problems. 
(a) He need not and perhaps should not be prepared to stake 
anything on it-which is the most important case of acting on 
it. For he may believe that the relevant actions would not be 
warranted without further evidence, or that until others can 
be expected to accept it no action should be taken on it. Thus, 
(b) two quite different questions can and should still be dis-
tinguished. (i) Is the hypothesis scientifically acceptable? 
(ii) Given how probable it is on the scientific evidence for the 
hypothesis, is it reasonable to act on it? 
Question (ii) will have different reasonable answers as 
applied to different actions. It mayor may not have moral 
ramifications. In either case, however, it is not a question for 
the scientist as such, though competently answering it may 
require scientific training or some conceptual sophistication. 
The plausibility of both (a) and (b) is readily seen in the light 
of the twofold character of scientific acceptance, stressed 
above. For instance, if one accepts h, while having the second-
order belief that acceptance is just barely warranted by avail-
able evidence, in believing it, it is easy to see how one might 
be reluctant to act on it. Apart from acts in which little is 
at stake, commitment to any action on the hypothesis without 
more evidence may be avoided. One may embrace before one 
is ready to trust. 
All this can be illustrated by the drug example. The scien-
tist may accept the hypothesis of its non-toxicity with the 
hope of eventually using it widely as medication and with the 
intention to test it further, yet-as Levi would agree-justi-
fiably decide not to support its general use. This illustrates the 
distinction just made: the scientist, as scientist, answers the 
question of scientific acceptability positively, but, as a respon-
sible moral agent, negatively answers the question whether, 
given the scientific evidence, it is reasonable to put the drug 
into general use. This should not, however, be described as a 
refusal to "act on" the hypothesis [as Levi (1960) suggested] . 
The refusal is less general than that, and it is relative to a 
context. Thus, the scientist's acceptance of the hypothesis 
might carry a willingness to act on it in some situations, 
e.g. where forced, in a life-or-death situation, to decide wheth-
er to use it. Presumably here the scientist would, for himself 
at least, use the drug; and surely he might act on the hypothe-
sis at least to the extent of arguing that it deserves further 
testing. 
This sort of relation between acceptance and action may 
be part of what motivated Rudner's argument: surely it is 
plausible to hold that accepting a hypothesis implies a disposi-
tion to act on it in some possible circumstances. But this 
disposition is consistent with a second-order belief that the evi-
dence is just barely sufficient to warrant believing h and does 
not justify staking anything on h. Thus, the toxicity example 
and similar ones do not undermine the distinction between 
questions (i) and (ii), or show that (i) cannot be non-morally 
and objectively answered. As suggested, one reason why this 
distinction is missed may be that acceptance of h is often mis-
takenly construed as simply believing it. But in fact acceptance 
carries varying degrees of conviction that h, and varying beliefs 
about the credibility of h. A rational person neither acquires 
conviction whose strength is disproportionate to his assessment 
of the evidence, nor, in acting, stakes more on an accepted 
hypothesis than is warranted by his degree of conviction in 
accepting it or by the specific probability, if any, he attributes 
to it. 
These points bear on a recent attempt by Gaa (1977) to 
undermine the view that science is morally autonomous. We 
are asked to imagine a situation in which a scientist studying 
a freshwater lake system arrives at what are taken to be a 
number of scientifically acceptable hypotheses about relations 
among the constituents in the system. Now suppose that a 
policy-maker needs to decide what, if anything, to do about 
"nuisance algal bloom" in bodies of water of the relevant 
kind. 
Since a probability value ... on the relevant hypothe-
sis is also needed in making the decisions, a hypothesis 
concerning what that probability value is, must be 
accepted-and the costs associated with doing so are, 
in general, different. Presumably, the costs of error 
in the policymaker's case are much higher than those 
of the scientist .... Now, the autonomy thesis re-
quires in such a situation that the scientist should 
ignore the needs of the policymaker-since the needs 
of the former come first (and, indeed, alone), there is 
no reason to gather more evidence (Gaa, 1977). 
The upshot is that "in the kinds of situations just delineated, 
the scientist qua scientist should act unethically." 
Whereas Rudner argued that scientists qua scientists make 
value judgments, Gaa argued in addition that if they do not, 
then living up to the moral autonomy of science thesis may 
require them to act unethically. Two points may be made in 
reply. 
First, the phrase "the costs associated with doing so," 
i.e., with accepting such a value, implies willingness to act on 
the hypothesis, if only by leaving the nuisance algal bloom 
alone. But by itself it does not imply this; it implies it only 
given (among other things) a further judgment of how well 
confirmed the hypothesis must be to justify acting on it. That 
judgment will be in part based on moral considerations, but it 
is not one the scientist as such should make. One might reply 
that even apart from such a judgment, the policy-maker must 
act on the hypothesis, since he must put a chemical in the 
lake or not. It is true that this must be done or not, but neith-
er action need be based on the hypothesis; hence, neither need 
be acting on it. For example, the lake might simply be left 
alone on the ground that there is no good reason to do other-
wise. 
The second point is that nothing in the moral autonomy 
thesis, or in the view that scientific acceptance is morally 
neutral, entails that "the scientist should ignore the needs of 
the policymaker." Surely Gaa forgot here that the autonomy 
thesis concerns the scientist qua scientist. Such a scientist is, 
of course, an abstraction, a convenient but unfortunately mis-
leading device for talking about the logic of the scientific 
enterprise. One cannot be a scientist qua scientist without also 
being a person. A person should be ethically responsible, 
and, of course, the person who is a scientist studying lakes 
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should, if possible given moral obligations and resources, pro-
vide the policy-maker more information. But this is consistent 
with the scientist qua scientist being motivated wholly by a 
desire to pursue a purely scientific quest for truth. One would 
hope, moreover, that the figures the policy-maker gets from 
the scientist are based on just such a quest. It would be most 
unfortunate if the only scientific assessments of hypotheses 
the former could get were filtered through the scientist's moral 
judgments. 
III 
So far, the view that scientists as such do not accept 
hypotheses has not been discussed. As Levi has contended, 
adopting this view is not necessary to defending the thesis that 
scientific acceptance does not require making moral judg-
ments. But why should Levi have said that adopting it is like 
fleeing from Charybdis into the hands of Scylla? Granted, 
scientists often accept and sometimes even argue vehemently 
for hypotheses. But this could be regarded as extra-scientific; 
even the scientific search for truth could be accounted for by 
saying that scientists seek to articulate the best confirmed 
hypotheses and theories they can discover in the relevant 
scientific domain (perhaps allowing simplicity to figure as a 
subsidiary ideal). If, as human beings, they cannot help accept-
ing certain apparently true hypotheses or theories, this only 
shows that they operate in two roles: the scientific and the 
pragmatic. To be sure, on this view scientists would still tenta-
tively accept judgments of the degree of confirmation of 
various hypotheses, or at least comparative judgments to the 
effect that one hypothesis is better confirmed than its rivals. 
But they need not accept any actual scientific hypothesis. 
This view of science is not indefensible, but it seems pref-
erable to conceive the scientific enterprise more broadly. If 
it is supposed that scientists as such accept hypotheses, then 
the view expressed by Levi and others, that the value-neutral-
ity thesis-and scientific objectivity in general-does allow 
those value judgments which are implicit in the canons of 
scientific inference is accepted. These are plausibly considered 
purely epistemic, and it is reasonable to suppose that they 
could be made by a purely epistemic agent, in the sense of 
one whose only aims are to believe (certain sorts of) truths 
and avoid erroneous beliefs. Similarly, scientific objectivity 
allows scientists to make what Nagel (1961) called "character-
izing value judgments," which are, roughly, judgments of the 
value of a thing as a means to something else. These too may 
be plausibly argued to be neither in any sense moral nor neces-
sarily open to bias by subjective influences. The question of 
when a hypothesis is acceptable relative to the evidence is one 
on which rational persons may disagree. But enough has been 
said to suggest why it is not a moral question. The values it 
involves are epistemic: acceptability here is analogous to the 
notion of a good (deductive or inductive) argument, not to 
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that of a right act. Rudner was thus mistaken in claiming that 
determining the degree of confirmation of a hypothesis is itself 
accepting a hypothesis whose assessment involves value con-
siderations of a moral or at least non-epistemic kind. A good 
argument itself may not be morally neutral, but a prima facie 
cogent case for that position has apparently not been made. 
This way of replying to Rudner's claim contrasts with the 
view taken by Levi, at least in his initial response to Rudner. 
Levi there suggested that the claim can be refuted only by 
establishing a positive answer to the question whether "the 
canons of scientific inference dictate the assignment of mini-
mum probabilities in such a way as to permit no differences in 
the assignments made by different investigators to the same 
... hypotheses." This is an important question whose answer 
is not clear. No attempt will be made to answer it here. How-
ever, defense of the moral neutrality of scientific acceptance 
does not require a positive answer. 
It is essential, in discussing the notion of acceptability, 
to bear in mind an adequate distinction between the vagueness 
of concepts or claims and their subjectivity. Consider the claim 
that something is blue. It is vague. Is it also subjective? 
Granted, vagueness often allows subjective judgments to gen-
erate disagreements. The vagueness of "intelligent," e.g., may 
lead to disagreements about someone's intelligence, based on 
subjective judgments of "brightness." But notice that it is 
possible to be clearly right or clearly wrong about colors (or 
intelligence), in a way in which it does not seem possible to be 
clearly right or clearly wrong in many matters of taste (those 
plausibly considered subjective). Moreover, disagreement over 
whether something is blue can often be resolved by attention 
to terminology. These and related points show that vagueness 
does not entail subjectivity, and surely that applies to "ac-
ceptability" as well as to many other terms. 
Notice also that most people will agree that certain speci-
mens are paradigms of blue, and these can be appealed to in 
resolving some disagreements about non-paradigm cases. A 
similar point holds for scientific hypotheses in respect to 
acceptability; and, just as the epistemically cautious will not 
apply "blue" where their less strict colleagues do-without 
this implying either subjectivity or any (non-epistemic) value 
judgment-scientists may differ in the application of "accept-
able" without this implying either subjectivity or any (non-
epistemic) value judgment. 
Applying this to questions of the confirmation and ac-
ceptability of hypotheses, suppose for the sake of argument 
that a precise method cannot be found, which commands the 
assent of all rational persons who understand it, for assigning 
inductive probabilities to hypotheses given the scientific evi-
dence for them, and suppose that even if it were found, scien-
tists would disagree on the minimum probability required for 
acceptability. If there is high intersubjective agreement among 
scientists on (a) whether purported evidence confirms a 
hypothesis and (b) which of two competing hypotheses, if 
either, is better confirmed by the purported scientific evi-
dence, the notions of confirmation and acceptability might 
still be sufficiently objective to sustain, in the assessment of 
hypotheses, the moral neutrality thesis and scientific objectiv-
ity. Such intersubjective agreement may not exist among 
scientists; but it has not been shown to be an unrealistic ideal, 
and it is certainly more readily defended than the quantitative 
ideal to which some people apparently want to tie scientific 
objectivity. 
IV 
We may conclude, then, that neither Rudner's argument 
nor similar ones show that the scientific acceptance of hypoth-
eses requires making moral or other non-epistemic judgments. 
It may be true that even if scientists qua scientists do not ac-
cept scientific hypotheses they do accept propositions about 
degrees of confumation which might be called hypotheses; 
and there certainly appear to be alternative rational sets of 
criteria of acceptance and of confirmation. Perhaps selecting 
of one or another set of either kind can be shown to require 
moral considerations; but this does not appear to have been 
shown. Moreover, if it turns out that, on any plausible cri-
teria, "degree of confirmation" and "acceptability" remain 
vague, it may not be inferred either that they are not objective 
or that differences in their application must be attributed 
to moral or other non-epistemic normative judgments. When 
Rudner's (1953) arguments-and the many similar ones pro-
posed since -are rightly understood in the light of these points 
and the distinctions developed above, they cease to appear 
to undermine the thesis that scientific acceptance is, in princi-
ple, morally neutral. 
There remain two important and often neglected prob-
lems which have not been broached. First, if simplicity is a 
properly scientific criterion of acceptability, is there an ob-
jective way of judging it? Second, even if the inductive proba-
bility of a hypothesis given the scientific evidence for it can 
be determined precisely, how can it be determined objective-
ly when there is enough evidence-and enough warrant for 
believing the evidence statements-to make even a high induc-
tive probability justify actually accepting the hypothesis? 
If these problems cannot be resolved, then the defense of 
the moral neutrality thesis, and of scientific objectivity in gen-
eral, may at least need to move closer to the view that scientists 
qua scientists do not accept or reject hypotheses. The prob-
lems can perhaps be resolved, and reasons given here suggest 
that the relevant issues are epistemic and prima facie capable 
of objective resolution. In any case, supposing the defense of 
the moral neutrality of science does require adopting the view 
that scientists qua scientists do not accept or reject scientific 
hypotheses, this narrower view of scientific practice is unlikely 
to prevent adequate treatment of the central questions in the 
philosophy of science. At present, however, we may apparent-
ly suppose that scientists qua scientists do accept hypotheses 
and that scientific acceptance is, in principle, morally neutral. 
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